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Respondents, 
Case No. 14,376 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to impose a constructive trust upon cer-
tain property purchased from the appellants by the third-party 
defendants. Appellants claim that the third-party defendants 
agreed to hold four (4) building lots sold to them in trust for 
the defendants and third-party plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury on the 2 3rd and 24th day 
of September, 19 75, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock. The 
Court found in favor of the defendants Carter and against the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
The plaintiffs objected to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law of the trial court and made a motion to make additional 
findings and a motion for a new trial. On November 20, 19 75, the 
Court denied plaintiffs' objection and motions- The plaintiffs 
appeal the decision of the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the Court declare that a construc-
tive trust was imposed upon certain property purchased by the 
third-party defendants from the plaintiffs, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 13, 1962, the llielsons and Rasmussens entered into 
an agreement whereby the Nieisons agreed to deed to the Rasmussens 
thirteen building lots. As consideration for the deeding of the 
lots, the Rasmussens agreed to build a house for the Nieisons on 
property owned by the Nieisons. The house was to cost not less 
than $13,000.00. The house was completed in July, 19 62, and the 
Nieisons moved in and continued to live in the house until Mr* 
Nielson died and Mrs. Nielson was hospitalized. 
In July, 1965, the Nieisons discovered the house cost only 
$8,500.00 to build, not $13,000.00, as agreed and subsequently 
brought suit against the Rasmussens (R. 4-8). About the same 
time the dispute between the Rasmussens and the Nieisons arose 
the third-party defendant, Bert Carter, became interested in the 
property owned by the Nieisons. The Nieisons settled their claim 
against the Rasmussens and agreed that upon completion of the 
terms of the settlement agreement, they would dismiss with pre-
judice their lav/suit against the Rasmussens (R. 16-21) . Because 
the defendant Carter was interested in purchasing the remaining 
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Nielson property/ a meeting was arranged whereby the Rasmussens and 
Carter would determine which lots would be transferred to Rasmus-
sens in the event Carter purchased the property. 
Problems with the description of the property to be trans-
ferred arose in view of the fact that Carter anticipated sub-
dividing the Nielson property and wished to file a subdivision 
plat which would describe the Nielson property for future develop-
ment. 
While these negotiations were continuing, Carter^induced the 
Nielsons to transfer all of their property to him on the promise 
that he would later transfer four (4) lots to the Rasmussens. 
The Nielsons entered into the agreement without discussing the 
matter with their attorney, relying upon the representations of 
Carter, whom they trusted completely. Carter admits discussing 
the transfer of the lots with the Rasmussens and admits that he 
knew that the Rasmussens claimed some interest in the lots. 
On January 18, 1974, the Rasmussens answered the complaint 
of the Nielsons originally filed in 1966, and also counterclaimed 
against the Nielsons, claiming the Nielsons failed to comply with 
the terms of the settlement agreement. The Rasmussens further 
filed a third-party complaint against Carter, claiming Carter in-
duced the Nielsons to breach their settlement agreement with the 
Rasmussens (R. 11-15). 
On February 7, 1974, the Nielsons answered the Rasmussens1 
counterclaim and, in addition, filed a third-party complaint 
against Carter claiming that Carter participated in the nego-
tiation that culminated in the settlement agreement with the 
Rasmussens. The theory of the Nielsons1 third-party complaint 
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was that Carter was holding the lots in constructive trust for 
the Rasmussens (R. 26-28). 
Carter denies that ha at any time held the lots in trust 
for the Rasmussens. Both the Rasmussens and the Nielsons 
contend that they did not discover that Carter had failed to 
place the lots in escrow or that he denied that the Rasmussens had 
any interest in the properties until April 18, 19 74 when his 
deposition was taken* 
After trial of the matter, the Court entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law which stated that the defendant 
Carter did not agree to hold any part of the property in trust 
for the Rasmussens and that the conveyance of the property by 
Nielsons to Carters was not made upon any agreement that Carters 
would hold the four lots as trustees for plaintiffs (R. 160). 
The Court also found that there was no confidential relationship 
existing between the Nielsons and the Carters and that the rela-
tionship between the Nielsons and the Carters was of a seller and 
buyer of real estate without prior dealings (R. 160). Appellants 
appeal the decision of the trial court. 
All parties have agreed which lots will be subject to the 
constructive trust if it is imposed by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The main issue before the trial court and the basic issue of 
this appeal is whether the sale of property by the Nielsons to 
the Carters was subject to a constructive trust in favor of the 
Rasmussens. Appellants contend that the written agreement be-
tween the plaintiffs and third-party defendants (Ex. 1) did not 
reflect the true intent and agreement between the parties in that 
-4-
it failed to state that the property was subject to an interest 
of the Rasnussens in approximately 1-1/3 acres (four unspecified 
lots), that defendant Bert Carter had previously promised to 
convey to the Rasmussens. Parol evidence was offered at trial 
to prove the terms and existence of this oral agreement. This 
evidence clearly established that the written contract and deed 
(Exs. 1 and 2) did not contain all of the terms agreed upon by 
the parties, and showed that the defendant Bert Carter had taken 
the property with an understanding that he would convey the four 
unspecified lots to the Rasmussens. The evidence also clearly 
established that a relationship of confidence existed between the 
Nielsons and Mr. Carter. Appellants, therefore, maintain that 
the trial court erred in not finding that the conveyance between 
the parties was subject to a constructive trust. 
POINT I 
TEE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPpSE A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST ON THE LAND CONVEYED TO THE CARTERS. 
Utah law clearly supports the imposition of a constructive 
trust to remedy an inequitable situation. This imposition is 
particularly applicable to the reformation of a written document 
to prevent an unconscionable result. The latest Utah case sup-
porting this doctrine is Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah, 
1975). This case also involved a conveyance of real property and 
is very similar to the present case. 
The Kesler decision clearly sets forth the standard for the 
imposition of a constructive trust on a written instrument so 
that the conveyance may reflect the real intent of the parties as 
proven by parol evidence. 
- 5 - • 
Concerning defendant's contention that he 
had a right to place inviolable reliance upon 
the written instruments and that they were not 
subject to be varied or contradicted because of 
the parol evidence rule/ this is to be said: 
that rule has long been recognized as sound 
and as having a salutary purpose in proper 
circumstances. But, like all other rules, its 
purpose is to serve the cause of justice and 
not to defeat it. Therefore, there have come 
into being numerous exceptions in situations 
where the rigid adherence to the rule would 
have that effect- One of the notable ones, 
which has application here, is that as between 
the immediate parties, where the terms of the 
written instrument are mistaken in that they 
do not show what the true intent and agree-., 
ment between the parties was, it may be re-
formed to show that intent. 542 P.2d at 358. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs are seeking to have the 
written instrument "reformed" by having a constructive trust 
imposed upon the transfered property. Regardless of the methods 
of reformation used, appellants believe that the standard is the 
same.' 
Although the Kesler opinion was handed down after this case 
was decided at the trial level, this rule of law is not new to 
Utah. Appellants contend that the rule precisely fits the facts 
in this case and that the evidence clearly established the 
grounds for its application. 
Other Utah decisions and the law in other jurisdictions sup-
port the imposition of constructive trusts in situations similar 
to those in the present case. The case of Haws v. Jensen, 116 
Utah 2d 212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949) is particularly pertinent and 
should be controlling in this case. In Haws, this Court ruled 
that a constructive trust should be imposed on land conveyed by 
warranty deed, even though the deed was absolute on its face. 
The Haws decision points out that an oral agreement to dispose of 
or to hold land in a certain manner may constitute the basis of a 
constructive trust. In ruling on this issue, the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
. . . under certain circumstances existing at 
the time a conveyance in trust is made, no writ-
ing evidencing an intent to create a trust is 
required. In those instances, equity will im-
press a constructive trust upon the property 
in favor of the person or persons designated 
by the grantor as the beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries of the oral trust. A constructive 
trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent 
unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law 
and is^not within the statute of frauds. 209 
P.2d at 231. 
Decisions in other jurisdictions also support the equity of 
imposing constructive trusts upon property that was conveyed by a 
deed absolute. The Wyoming case of Edmonds v. Galey, 458 P.2d 
650 (Wyo. 1969) recognizes that the aforementioned rule is the 
"prevailing" one and states that the intent of the parties may be 
proved by parol evidence. The Wyoming court cites the following 
cases as standing for this rule of equity: Suburban Home Mortg. 
Co. v. Hopwood, 83 Ohio App. 115, 81 N.E.2d 387, 390; Hill v. 
Irons, 160 Ohio St. 21, 113 N.E.2d 243, 247; Jose v. Pacific Title 
and Porcelain Co., 251 Cal. App.2d 141, 58 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882; 
Hansen v. Bear Film Co., 28 Cal. 2d 154, 168 P.2d 946; and Haws v. 
Jensen, supra; Cf. Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594 
(1961). 
For other cases which hold that a constructive trust should 
be imposed when the grantee has orally promised to reconvey land 
and subsequently refuses to perform, see King v. Uhlmann, 103 
Ariz. 136, 437 P.2d 928 (1968); Orella v. Johnson, 38 Cal.2d 693, 
242 P.2d 5 (1952); Shipe v. Hillman, 206 Ore. 556, 292 P.2d 123 
(1955); and Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wash.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393 
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(1955) . 
The California case of Steinberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal. 
App. 116, 140 P.2d 31 (1943) is very similar to the facts in this 
case. The California court imposed a constructive trust on the 
theory that the repudiation of an oral promise to reconvey is a 
fraud upon the transferor which gives rise to a constructive 
trust, by which the courts will compel restitution. For other 
cases, which show that constructive trusts should be imposed to 
prevent the unconscionable enrichment of a party due to any abuse 
of the confidence of another, see Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah 
133, 141 P.2d 882 (1943); In Re Estate of Rose, 10 8 Ariz. 101, 
493 P.2d 112 (1972); and Austin v. Wysowatcky, 511 P.2d 526 
(Colo. 1973). 
All of the above cases show that a court, sitting in equity, 
should enforce a constructive trust when it is evident that a 
grantor, trusting that the grantee would perform an oral agree-
ment, has conveyed his property by absolute deed. Appellants 
believe that the evidence at trial clearly supported and proved 
all of the necessary factors. 
During the course of the trial, the plaintiffs introduced 
evidence from three separate individuals which indicated that the 
defendant Bert Carter knew that the fifteen acres were subject to 
an interest of the Rasmussens and that he would have to convey 
four unspecified lots to them. The deposition of the plaintiff, 
Archie Nielson (deceased), was read into the record and in it, he 
repeatedly alleged that Garter had agreed to convey four lots to 
Wesley Rasmussen subsequent to the original conveyance. (Tr. 31, 
36, 37, 40, "41-42, 43, 45, 55, 66, 67, 69, 70). Sylvia Nielson 
confirmed these allegations and the fact that this condition was 
made explicitly clear at the time of the signing on May 18, 1966. 
(T.r.-86, 91, 93, 96-97, 101, 106, 112-114). LaPreal Crompton was 
also present at the Nielson home when the negotiations and sign-
ing occurred. She verified that the agreement was made and that 
Carter promised to reconvey four lots to Rasmussen. (Tr. 161, 
162, 163, 167-168) . 
Perhaps the most important testimony is that of the defen-
dant Bert Carter. Although Carter denies the agreement, he made 
the-following admissions, which illustrate that Carter knew of 
Rasmussens1 interest and, therefore, had not paid for that por-
tion of the land which was subject to the trust: 
Q [Mr. Lewis] At the time of the signing 
of the agreement did you — and thereafter did 
you know there was one and one-third acres in 
that property that didn't belong to you? 
* * * 
A I knew that there was some property that 
I talked to Mr. Nielson about that I told him 
that I was going to hold a little money back on 
account I wasn't sure there was going to be a 
clear deed and without liens and encumberances 
on that property until him and Rasmussen got 
through a feuding. And he said that's all right. 
Q (By Mr. Lewis) And that was one and 
one-third acres, was it not? 
MR. JEFFS: Objection 
A Well, approximately. Close to it, yes. 
Q (By Mr. Lewis) Well, that's what you 
considered, wasn't it, one and one-third acres 
to make up four lots? 
A Well, I came to that conclusion by the .. -
amount' of money-wise. • There was 19 hundred 
dollars, I paid 14 hundred dollars an acre. So 
you can see it would be around an acre and a 
third, or in any location of the 15 acres, not 
in one location. It was just held back for my 
security to make sure I got a clear piece of 
property. 
-Q-. 
Q And you're still holding that back as of 
today, are you not? 
A I am as of today until this feuding gets 
over. That's legally, morally his money. It 
hasn't been money that's been taken out of the 
contract. It is assigned money that is his 
money, that is due him. (Tr. 138) 
Carter's testimony was also impeached by his admissions at 
his previous deposition. This exchange was presented to Carter 
at trial: 
Q Well, let me call your attention to page 
7 of your deposition, line 8, and ask you if you 
did not answer — if this question was not asked 
you and you gave the following answer. "Question: 
It was your understanding that lots were to be 
transferred to the Rasmussens?" "Answer: Yes." 
"At all time it's been your understanding?" 
"Answer: Uh-huh." (Tr. 130-131).. 
At other times in the trial, Carter referred to the lots in ques-
tion as "his lots" (referring to Rasmussen) (Tr. 122, line 21). 
His testimony also clearly reveals that he was aware of the Ras-
mussen fs interest prior to the deeding of the property: \ 
Q (By Mr. Lewis) "Question: When did you 
first learn that Mr. Nielson was to transfer pro-
perties to the Rasmussens?" "Answer: That was 
right about the time the contract was made up, 
and I was buying the ground before I knew that." 
"Question: But you did know it before the con-
tract for the sale of the land was written?" 
"Answer: Yes." Now, was that your testimony? 
A Yes, I knew it before the transfer of 
the land. 
Q And is that your testimony at the present 
time? - . . 
A I knew before the signing of.the contracts 
but I didn't agree to it. 
Q You knew, did you not, that there were, 
four lots that were to go to the Rasmussens, four 
lots that were north of the creek? 
A I knew that they wanted four lots north 
of the creek. (Tr. 129). 
This testimony clearly shows that Carter was aware of Ras-
mus-sens -1---: interest in the land and that he had deducted the cost 
of the 1-1/3 acres from the total price of the purchase. These 
admissions negate Carter's denial of Rasmussens1 interest and the 
agreement between the parties. Carter's testimony also points 
out that he knew of the Rasmussens1 claim and interest before the 
documents were executed. (Tr. 144). , 
The evidence clearly and convincingly proves that the con-
veyance was made with an understanding that Carter would later 
convey four lots to Wesley Rasmussen although there was no men-
tion of this promise in the formal documents. That the documents 
did not reflect the entire agreement is also evident from the 
testimony of Archie Nielson (Tr. 28, 37, 38, 40, 67, 69), Sylvia 
Nielson (Tr. 86, 96-97, 102, 104, 106), and LaPreal Crompton (Tr. 
161, 163, and 167). Such testimony is clearly admissible under 
Haws to prove the evidence of the oral agreement and to establish 
the constructive trust. 
Because the clear weight of the evidence shows the existence 
of an oral agreement which is not reflected in the terms of the 
written contract or deed, the trial court erred in refusing to 
impose a constructive trust on the land deeded to Bert and Blanch 
Carter. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING CONCERNING A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION-
SHIP WAS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. -
The trial court properly recognized that one of the precon-
ditions for the imposition of a constructive trust is the exis-
tence of a confidential relationship between the parties which 
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causes the grantor to rely on the assurances of the grantee. 
This was the applicable law in this matter pursuant to the stan-
dard set forth in the Haws case, supra: 
A constructive trust is imposed even if 
there is no fiduciary relationship such as that 
between attorney and client, principal and agent, 
trustee and beneficiary; it is sufficient that 
there is a family relationship or other personal ' ' 
relationship of such a character that the trans-
feror is justified in believing that the trans-
feree will act in his interest?71 Restatement 
of the Law of Trust, Sec. 44, comment (c), accord. 
A constructive trust will be imposed even though 
at the time of the transfer the transferee in-
tended to perform the agreement, and even though 
he was not guilty of undue influence in procur-
ing the conveyance. The abuse of the confiden-
tial relation consists merely in the failure of 
the transferee to perform his promise. Scott on 
Trust, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity 
in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by 
no unyielding formula, but is free to effect 
justice according to the equities peculiar to 
each transaction wherever.a failure to perform 
a duty to convey property would result in unjust 
enrichment. 209 P.2d at 232, (emphasis added) 
This standard is accepted by the majority of jurisdictions. As 
stated in 76 Am.Jur.2d, Trusts, §236: 
A constructive trust arises where a convey-
ance is induced on the agreement of a fiduciary 
or confidant to hold in trust for a reconveyance 
or other purpose, where the fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship is one upon which the grant-
or justifiably can and does rely and where the 
agreement is breached, since the breach of the 
agreement is an abuse of the confidence, and to 
establish such a trust it is not necessary to 
show fraud or intent not to perform the agree-
ment when it was made. The tendency of the 
courts is to construe the term "confidence or 
"confidential relationship'' liberally in favor 
-of the confider and against the confidant, for 
the purpose of raising a constructive trust on 
a violation or betrayal thereof. 
For other Utah cases imposing a constructive trust upon abuse of 
a confidential relationship, see Hawkins v. Perry, 12 3 Utah 16, 
253 P.2d 372 (1953); Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah 133, 141 P.2d 
882 (1943); and Free v. Farnsworth, 105 Utah 583, 144 P.2d 532 
(1943). All of these decisions were based on a desire to do 
justice between the parties and prevent the fraudulent enrichment 
of one party who had violated the confidence of another* These 
decisions reflect a well-established Utah doctrine which was not 
properly applied by the trial court. 
The evidence at trial clearly showed the prerequisite condi-
tions of confidence and trust. In fact, a statement to this 
effect was found in the contract itself (Ex. 1): 
The sellers acknowledge that they are mak-
ing a conveyance of title to the buyers prior to 
the payment of the full purchase price, but that 
they do so knowing of the credibility of the 
buyers and with full trust and confidence in the 
buyers. (p. 3). 
Further evidence of the relationship of the parties was the fact 
that no interest was charged on the unpaid balance. Uncontra-
dicted evidence at the trial showed that the Nielsons trusted 
Carter and believed that he would convey the property even though 
the deed made no mention of a reservation to the Rasmussens. 
(Tr. 95-96, 102, 168). 
An additional factor that must be considered is the advanced 
age and condition of the decedent Archie Nielson and of Sylvia 
Nielson. Again, the uncontraverted testimony at trial showed 
that Mr. Nielson had only one leg, was confined mainly to his 
house, and that he was past seventy years of age. In fact, 
counsel for the respondents stipulated that Mr. Nielson was 
crippled and that he had problems getting around. The applica-
tion of an implied trust is more necessary in such circumstances 
than it would be under normal conditions. This rule is set forth 
in the California case of Adams v. Bloom, 142 P.2d 775 (Calif. 
1943) . As in Adams , Nielson was old and relied on the statements 
of one whom he trusted. In affirming the trial court decree 
which had imposed a constructive trust, the appellate court 
defined the confidential relationship standard with regard to 
those of advanced age: 
It is not essential to show a relation-
ship by affinity or consanguinity, or that the 
business transacted established a particular re-
lationship between the parties, such as attor-
ney and client or principal and agent. If the 
parties be friends, and the grantor repose con-
fidence in the grantee, especially if in addi-
tion there exist an advisory business relation-
ship, and the one reposing confidence be of ad-
vanced age, an implied trust may result. (em-
phasis added) 
All of the evidence in this case points to the trust and 
confidence involved. The statements in the legal documents, the 
lack of legal specificity, the prior dealings of the parties, and 
the ages and acts of Archie and Sylvia Nielson, all clearly show 
that the relationship was one of confidence £nd trust. The trial 
court's finding of fact to the contrary is clearly erroneous and 
should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The clear weight of the evidence at trial showed that the 
third-party defendant, Bert Carter, had received the fifteen 
acres in question subject to an agreement that he would convey 
four of the lots in that acreage to the defendant Rasmussens;. 
His refusal to do so was a breach of that promise and the trial 
court's failure to impose a constructive trust was error. The 
evidence clearly showed the requisite confidential relationship 
between the grantors and grantees. In failing to impose the 
constructive trust, the trial court violated the rules of law set 
forth by this Court in the Haws v. Jensen decision. Therefore, 
the appellants ask this Court to reverse the findings of the 
trial court and to order judgment entered accordingly. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this 31 — day of March, 1976. 
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